超长混凝土框架早期温度应力公式的修正

以一超长混凝土框架结构实例为基础,采用有限元分析软件ANSYS对影响结构温度应力的四种主要影响因素(结构长度、柱子刚度、梁刚度、柱间跨度)进行分析,利用粘弹性理论做正交试验极差分析.依据正交试验基本原理建立与之对应的九个ANSYS模型,基于正交实验的结果对已有温度应力的公式做一定的修改,具有一定的实际指导意义.     

汇聚传统教材精华 吸纳新近科研成果——冯力斌、白萌主编《声乐教程》评析

《声乐教程》是旨为促进学生全面发展的音乐教育针对性的声乐教材,强化了"全能"教育理念,培养了艺术综合能力,探索了根据教学需要的音乐教育课程结构,采用实用性强的进阶技术训练途径,在置换或更新教材教法中为学界提供了很多有益经验。在对其评析基础上,针对近年来声乐教材编写现状提出发展建议。     

人工智能心理学研究的知识图谱分析

借助CitespaceⅢ对选自WoS的人工智能心理学研究文献进行知识图谱探析,结合自动聚类视图与议题标签展现了人工智能心理学领域的6个知识聚类:#0人工智能解决问题议题;#1人工与人类认知共性议题;#2人工智能学习议题;#3人工智能脑科学议题;#4人工智能环境认知议题;#5人工智能表征议题。在深入探究各聚类的核心与热点知识的基础上分析了人工智能心理学发展的各阶段特征:1.上世纪50年代图灵和米勒等人对机器认知与学习等概念的猜想与初探;2.70-90年代纽厄尔、西蒙和莱尔德等人基于模块记忆与层级分析对人工智能信息处理模型的系统性构建;3.本世纪初基于神经生理学的降维数据认知理论的发展;4.当下人工智能贝叶斯大脑与深度学习理论的兴起。     

朋友圈社交行为对员工知识共享意愿的影响机制——职场友谊的中介作用和感知差异性的调节作用

基于社会影响理论,从社会影响的内化视角探究员工朋友圈社交行为对知识共享意愿的影响机制,并揭示了朋友圈社交行为对知识共享意愿的不同程度感知差异性的差异化作用。通过对255个有效样本进行分析发现:职场友谊完全中介了朋友圈社交行为与知识共享意愿的关系;职场友谊对知识共享意愿有着积极影响;感知差异性负向调节了"朋友圈社交行为-职场友谊-知识共享意愿"的前半径,即感知差异性水平低的员工通过加强社交互动会增强职场友谊,而感知差异性水平高的员工则会因为过度的社交互动而削弱其职场友谊。     

多孔介质球向渗流的渗透率分形模型

基于分形理论与技术，该文研究了牛顿流体在多孔介质中球向渗流问题，提出了牛顿流体球向渗流渗透率模型，分析了多孔介质的微结构参数对球向渗透率的影响.研究结果表明，球向渗透率随孔隙面积分形维数和孔隙度的增加而增加，随迂曲度分形维数和径向距离r的增加而减小；本模型预期结果与Chang和Yortsos的模型相比较吻合较好，证实了球向渗透率分形模型的正确性.     

‘Revolutions,philosophical as well as civil’: French chemistry and American science in Samuel Latham Mitchill’s Medical Repository

ABSTRACT

From 1797 to 1801 a controversy played out on the pages of the Medical Repository, the first scientific journal published in the United States. At its centre was the well-known feud between the followers of Antoine Lavoisier and Joseph Priestley, the lone supporter of the phlogiston model. The American debate, however, had more than two sides. The Americans chemists, Samuel Latham Mitchill and Benjamin Woodhouse, who rushed to support Priestley did not defend his scientific views. Rather, as citizens of a republic, they defended his right to have them. They also castigated the assertions of the “French chemists,” whose claims that the new chemistry obviated debate seemed unsettlingly similar to the dictatorial ambitions of the French state. Using the Medical Repository, Mitchill and Woodhouse sought a compromise that validated the new chemistry, but united it with a more egalitarian form of discourse. The desired balance eluded them. Priestley proved too stubborn, and as the French Revolution descended into dictatorship and war, Mitchill and Woodhouse came more to realize that truly prising French chemistry from the culture of the revolutionary era. The episode left Mitchill and Woodhouse disillusioned with chemistry and hoping to redirect scientific enthusiasm to more pious ends.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

Debunking material induction

In this paper, we present an explanatory objection to Norton's material theory of induction, as applied to predictive inferences. According to the objection we present, there is an explanatory disconnect between our beliefs about the future and the relevant future facts. We argue that if we recognize such a disconnect, we are no longer rationally entitled to our future beliefs.     

Epistemic benefits of the material theory of induction

C. D. Broad famously labelled the problem of providing our inductive practices with a proper justification “the scandal of philosophy” (Broad, 1952). Recently, John Norton has provided a dissolution of this problem (2014). According to Norton, inductive inference is grounded in particular facts obtaining within particular domains (J. Norton, 2003b, 2010, 2014). Because the material theory does not involve a universal schema of induction, Norton claims it dissolves the problem of induction (which implies that such universal schemas cannot be justified).In this paper, I critically evaluate Norton's dissolution. In particular, I argue that the problem of induction is an epistemological problem, that Norton's material theory entails an externalist epistemology, and that it is a common feature of such epistemologies that they dissolve the problem of induction. The upshot is that the material theory is not unique in its ability to reap the specifically epistemic benefits of dissolving the problem of induction, and thus that the epistemic advantages of the material theory over extant alternatives in this regard are fewer than it may appear at first sight.     

Intervening on time derivatives

Interventionism analyses causal influence in terms of correlations of changes under a distribution of interventions. But the correspondence between correlated changes and causal influence is not obvious. I probe its plausibility with a problem-case involving variables related as time derivative (velocity) to integral (position), such that the latter variable must change given an intervention on the former unless dependencies are introduced among the testing and controlling interventions. Under the orthodox criteria such interventions will fail to be appropriate for causal analysis. I consider various alternatives, including permitting control interventions to be chancy, restricting the available models and mitigating variation of off-path variables. None of these work. I then present a fourth suggestion which modifies the interventionist criteria in order to permit interventions which can influence other variables than just their own targets. The correspondence between correlated changes and causal influence can thereby saved when dependencies are introduced among such interventions. This modification and the required dependencies, I argue, are perfectly in line with practice and may also assist in a wider class of cases.